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United States v. Nixon: The Prelude
Philip Allen Lacovarat
Twenty-five years ago, as the staff lawyers in the
Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office were organizing our
investigation into the Watergate cover-up and related abuses,
executive privilege was not one of our immediate concerns.
President Nixon, however grudgingly, was allowing his senior
aides to testify, including his former White House Counsel and
by then principal accuser, John Dean. The major constitutional
question that my legal staff had to confront was whether an
incumbent President is subject to indictment. By mid-1973, as
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was launching a compre-
hensive criminal investigation into President Nixon's act-
ivities, that issue seemed more than merely hypothetical.
All of that changed dramatically when a White House staff
member, Alexander Butterfield, revealed to the Senate select
committee conducting a parallel investigation (the "Ervin
Committee") what even the most senior government officials
inside and outside the White House never even suspected:
"There is tape in the Oval Office." This news sent a
thunderclap though Washington. For months President Nixon
and his principal advisors during the suspected cover-up-
former Attorney General John Mitchell, chief of staff H.R.
Haldeman, and senior domestic counselor John Ehrlichman-
had resolutely denied knowing anything about responsibility
for the break-in at Democratic Party headquarters at the
Watergate office building during the 1972 presidential
campaign. They had branded Dean a liar as he gave chapter
and verse in public testimony before the Ervin Committee
accusing the three senior aides of deep complicity in covering
up the Administration's own role in authorizing the break-in
and then orchestrating the cover-up. When Dean disclosed his
t Mr. Lacovara was Counsel to Watergate Special Prosecutors
Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski and divided the argument of the "Nixon
Tapes" case in the Supreme Court with Mr. Jaworski. He is now a partner
with Mayer, Brown & Platt in New York and Washington.
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earlier reports to the President about their complicity, the
President disavowed his former counsel.
Suddenly, a debate that appeared to turn solely on the
credibility of various confficting witnesses, with Dean far
outnumbered, could be resolved through uniquely probative
evidence: contemporaneous recordings of conversations with
the President. Dean's testimony and meticulous White House
logs of the President's meetings and telephone calls made it
possible to pinpoint specific conversations likely to have
involved Watergate.
President Nixon, however, promptly rebuffed requests that
he voluntarily turn over to the investigators the tapes of those
sessions, claiming that the need to encourage absolute candor
in discussions between the President and his senior advisors
created an absolute, constitutionally based "executive
privilege" to withhold this evidence both from Congress and
from the Special Prosecutor. Moreover, Article II of the
Constitution invests the President with all executive power,
including the power and responsibility to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. Relying on his role as Chief Ex-
ecutive, President Nixon staked out the constitutional theory
that no subordinate officer, such as a specially appointed
prosecutor acting on behalf of the President's "own"
Department of Justice, had the right to challenge the
President's decision that it was not in the national interest to
release certain confidential information.
Cox then had to confront awful and ominous choices:
Should he try to use the subpoena power of the federal grand
jury probing the cover-up case in an effort to force the
President to yield the pertinent tapes, or avoid a constitutional
clash in which victory was by no means assured? The "right"
decision was hardly as clear as it may seem in hindsight. If
President Nixon remained obdurate-as he did, by refusing to
honor any of the tapes subpoenas without a bruising fight-
three of the four possible outcomes of a court battle would have
directly undermined the core principle that the Watergate
Special Prosecutor's Office had been conceived to establish:
that even the President is not above the law. First, Cox mused
that, if the courts sustained the President's claim to an
absolute privilege, they would be recognizing, for the first time,
a constitutional privilege to defy demands to produce the kind
of evidence that any other citizen would have to yield. The
result would be to shield high-level culprits, including the
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President himself, from the processes of the law. Second, if the
courts accepted the President's theory about the duty of a
subordinate executive branch officer to bend to the Chief
Executive's will, any President would be effectively immune
from federal criminal investigation.
A third, alternative scenario seemed no more appealing-
the prospect that the courts would uphold the Special
Prosecutor's right to pursue the tapes, despite the presidential
directive to the contrary, and would reject or overrule the
privilege claim, but then would be met with irremediable
defiance. The President quickly laid the foundation for this
end-game strategy. He publicly suggested that, as head of a
coordinate branch of government, he would no more be bound
to acquiesce in the federal courts' view of his constitutional
rights and immunities than they would have to accept his view
of their legitimate powers. For a man who had devoted his life
to the law and whose assignment was to vindicate the rule of
law, Cox was understandably uncomfortable about setting in
motion a process that not only would generate a constitutional
crisis but that might end with the President's defying the
Supreme Court-and getting away with it.
Nevertheless, he saw it as his duty to pursue the trail of
evidence, even though it led directly into the Oval Office. One
important ingredient in risking that course, though, was the
vote count. Cox had been the Solicitor General in the Kennedy
Administration and continued to follow the Court's work
closely as a Harvard Law School professor. I had just joined
him as his Counsel after serving as Deputy Solicitor General in
charge of the federal government's criminal cases in the
Supreme Court. And Cox's executive assistant, Peter
Kreindler, had recently finished clerking for Justice William 0.
Douglas. As the three of us did our prognostications, we
assured each other that our constitutional arguments would
probably command a majority of the Supreme Court. Never,
though, did we anticipate the unanimity that the Court
eventually forged in the Nixon Tapes decision' a year later.
So, Cox issued the first subpoena for White House tapes
and I went over to the White House and served it. As expected,
the President remained adamant, but Chief Judge John Sirica
of the district court promptly ordered him to comply, rejecting
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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the President's claims.2 The en banc United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the
President's petition for mandamus to quash the subpoena and
ordered compliance.3 As its stay of enforcement was about to
expire, the President ordered Cox to take no further steps to
enforce the courts' decrees. Cox found this order intolerable.
When he refused to desist, the President ordered him fired.
Attorney General Elliot Richardson, who had appointed Cox,
resigned rather than execute the order. Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus also declined to do the deed, and
the President fired him. To stop the bloodletting inside the
Justice Department, the ranking survivor, Solicitor General
Robert Bork, dismissed Cox.
This "Saturday Night Massacre" was the climax of the
Watergate affair. It provoked what the White House quickly
recognized was a firestorm of public outrage. It impelled the
House of Representatives to pursue impeachment. It forced
the White House to accede to appointment of a new Special
Prosecutor, a savvy and stubborn Texas trial lawyer, Leon
Jaworski. It left the President with no choice but to turn over
the subpoenaed recordings. And it so tarnished President
Nixon's standing at the bar of justice that a Supreme Court
line-up that we had never imagined a few months earlier
eventually became the death blow to his presidency: a few
months later the Court issued a unanimous ruling upholding
the Special Prosecutor's authority to demand evidence from the
President, overruling the claim of absolute privilege, and
ultimately requiring the President to produce another batch of
subpoenaed tapes. One of those tapes contained the "smoking
gun," proof that the President had helped orchestrate the
cover-up conspiracy from the very beginning.
The case that eventually reached the Supreme Court and
ended the Nixon presidency arose from a seemingly garden-
variety subpoena the Watergate prosecution trial team issued
under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
insisting that the President produce additional tapes for use at
the trial of the recently indicted cover-up conspirators, John
Mitchell et al. The President had never accepted the
2. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
3. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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constitutional doctrines that both Judge Sirica and the D.C.
Circuit had embraced before the Saturday night massacre. He
continued to assert that, at least unless and until the Supreme
Court itself "definitively" rejected his constitutional claims, he
would refuse to turn over any more tapes. Thus, we had to
plan our litigation strategy quite carefully to increase our
chances of securing such a "definitive" ruling.
First, side-stepping the delicate question whether an
incumbent President is indictable, we urged the grand jury to
find that President Nixon was an "unindicted co-conspirator,"
and it did so. Although this finding remained sealed until we
reached the Supreme Court, the charge that the subpoenaed
evidence was likely to show the President's own complicity in
crimes for which his friends and advisors were to be tried
tended to undermine his efforts to seize the high ground and
argue that he was simply defending the powers of the "Office of
the Presidency."
Second, once Judge Sirica rejected the President's motion
to quash the trial subpoena,4 and as soon as President Nixon's
lawyers filed papers seeking review in the D.C. Circuit, we took
back control of the initiative. Using a truly extraordinary
mechanism that the Supreme Court entertains only once every
twenty years or so, we immediately sought Supreme Court
review--certiorari before judgment"-to bring before the
Court Judge Sirica's ruling in our favor without awaiting a
decision by the court of appeals.
Not only did this tactic avoid the delay of a full round of
litigation in the appellate court, it gave us what I considered a
subtle but significant right: to style the caption of the case in
the Supreme Court. In earlier stages where the President was
seeking mandamus, the appropriate caption was "Nixon v.
Sirica," making it seem that this was a dispute between the
President and a lowly district judge, or between the executive
branch and the judicial branch. In our petition for certiorari,
we created the caption that now appears in the United States
Reports: "The United States v. Richard M. Nixon." Our goal
was to strengthen our constitutional arguments by assuming
the mantle of "counsel for the sovereign people of the United
States" seeking to enforce the obligation of every citizen,
4. United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.D.C. 1974).
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including one who just happened also to be the President, to
give evidence.5
Reinforcing what I must acknowledge was a bit of
posturing were two other gambits designed to convey to the
Justices that it was the Watergate Special Prosecutor, not
President Nixon, who was speaking for "the United States." By
custom (and now by Supreme Court Rule6) the pleadings
presented to the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the United States Government bear gray covers; any
other party must use a different color. By moving first, we
appropriated that hallmark of counsel for "the Government."
In addition, by tradition, the Solicitor General as the
Government's chief lawyer before the Supreme Court always
sits at the counsel table on the right side of the Chamber facing
the Court, whether appearing as petitioner or respondent. We
also claimed this symbolic position on the morning of the three
hours of oral argument the Court set for the case.
On only one other procedural gambit did Special
Prosecutor Jaworski balk at following my recommendation.
Virtually alone in this era, the Solicitor General and his staff,
who regularly appear before the Supreme Court on behalf of
the Government, maintain the custom of wearing formal dress
for argument, gray swallow-tail morning coat and striped
5. Recently, the Independent Counsel investigating the Whitewater and
Lewinsky matters, former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, tried to follow
these "precedents" in cases involving White House claims of executive
privilege, attorney-client privilege, and "presidential protective privilege," but
with mixed results.
When the White House sought Supreme Court review of an Eighth
Circuit decision rejecting a claim of attorney-client privilege for the debriefing
notes of White House counsel who interviewed the First Lady after her grandjury testimony, the White House sought to establish a playing field tilted
symbolically in its favor by styling its petition Office of the President v. Office
of the Independent Counsel. The Independent Counsel objected, relying on the
Nixon Tapes precedent, but the Court did not require any change. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1105 (1997).
After the judge supervising the grand jury in Washington overruled a
string of privilege claims and the White House appealed to the D.C. Circuit,
the Independent Counsel immediately sought certiorari before judgment,
again relying on the Nixon Tapes case and styling the cases United States v.
Clinton and United States v. [Treasury Secretary] Rubin. The Court accepted
those more tendentious captions, but denied the petitions, expressly
admonishing, however, that "[iut is assumed that the Court of Appeals will
proceed expeditiously to decide this case." 118 S. Ct. 2079 (1998).
6. Rule 33(e).
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trousers. Jaworski and I were to divide the argument, he
taking the opening forty-five minutes and I an equal amount of
time for rebuttal. I urged that we don formal dress to add the
final touch to our role as counsel for the people of the United
States. He demurred, firmly insisting that I should be happy
he was not going to wear a Texan's more customary garb,
complete with cowboy boots!
The then-junior Justice, William Rehnquist, had
disqualified himself from the case, because he had served
President Nixon as Assistant Attorney General for Legal
Counsel. Instead, he was placed in charge of allocating tickets
to the dignitaries, reporters, and spectators who wanted a seat
for the argument. Jaworski, Presidential counsel James St.
Clair, and I made our arguments in the allotted three hours.
There were no surprises until, barely two weeks later, the
Chief Justice summoned us back to Court to hear him deliver a
unanimous opinion unambiguously upholding the Special
Prosecutor's right to pursue the evidence and the federal
court's power to order the President to reveal it. By any
definition the decision stripped President Nixon of the chance
to ignore a non-"definitive" ruling against him.
Apart from relief and satisfaction with the outcome, our
reaction was far more guarded than one might think. First, in
a real sense, even though the forced disclosure of the "smoking
gun" tape compelled President Nixon to resign two weeks later,
he won on a major constitutional issue. The Court ruled that
executive privilege does exist. And it is not simply some
judicially fashioned common-law evidentiary privilege, but a
full-fledged constitutional privilege rooted in the separation of
powers, albeit a qualified rather than absolute privilege.
Second, we thought-rather naively, as it now turns out-
that it was highly unlikely that future Presidents would find
themselves on the business end of a federal grand jury
investigation. We assumed that the Court's holding on
executive privilege would rarely if ever be cited or refined in
later cases. Instead, we speculated that the principal practical
import of the "Nixon Tapes" case would be its ruling defining
the standards for issuing Rule 17(c) pretrial subpoenas in
conventional criminal cases!
This symposium demonstrates just how short-sighted we
were.
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